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In visual cognitive neuroscience the debate on consciousness is focused on two major
topics: the search for the neural correlates of the different properties of visual awareness
and the controversy on the graded versus dichotomous nature of visual conscious
experience. The aim of this study is to search for the possible neural correlates
of different grades of visual awareness investigating the Event Related Potentials to
reduced contrast visual stimuli whose perceptual clarity was rated on the four-point
Perceptual Awareness Scale. Results revealed a left centro-parietal negative deflection
(Visual Awareness Negativity; VAN) peaking at 280–320 ms from stimulus onset, related
to the perceptual content of the stimulus, followed by a bilateral positive deflection
(Late Positivity; LP) peaking at 510–550 ms over almost all electrodes, reflecting
post-perceptual processes performed on such content. Interestingly, the amplitude of
both deflections gradually increased as a function of visual awareness. Moreover, the
intracranial generators of the phenomenal content (VAN) were found to be located in
the left temporal lobe. The present data thus seem to suggest (1) that visual conscious
experience is characterized by a gradual increase of perceived clarity at both behavioral
and neural level and (2) that the actual content of perceptual experiences emerges from
early local activation in temporal areas, without the need of later widespread frontal
engagement.
Keywords: access consciousness, EEG, ERPs, neural correlates, perceptual awareness scale, phenomenal
consciousness, visual awareness
INTRODUCTION
Consciousness (or awareness) refers to the fact that, when we are awake, we have experiences.
Since consciousness gained enough consideration to be investigated in the field of cognitive
neuroscience, an intensive search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has been
undertaken. The NCC has been defined by Koch (2004) as “the minimal set of neuronal events
and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific conscious percept.”
Such NCC are usually investigated by contrasting neural responses to physically identical stimuli
that are consciously perceived or not, the so-called contrastive analysis (Baars, 1988), used across
different experimental paradigms in which visual awareness is manipulated (e.g., masking, change
blindness, reduced-contrast stimuli, etc. For a review, see Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010). fMRI
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studies have revealed that changes in conscious contents correlate
with activation along the ventral visual pathway (e.g., Bar et al.,
2001; Pins and Ffytche, 2003) with additional involvement of
frontal and parietal areas (e.g., Lumer and Rees, 1999; Beck
et al., 2001), revealing the key role of dorsal-ventral interactions
for visual awareness. The temporal dynamics of such neural
processing have been obtained by studying event-related brain
potentials (ERPs), the electrical potential changes in response to
a given sensory, motor or cognitive event (Luck, 2005). Recent
ERP studies have found that conscious perception consistently
correlates with an early component called Visual Awareness
Negativity (VAN; Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003), that is a negative
amplitude difference wave between aware and unaware trials
peaking at about 200 ms after stimulus onset in occipito-
temporal sites (Koivisto et al., 2008), but also observed at central,
fronto-polar (Wilenius-Emet et al., 2004) and occipital-parietal
(Pitts et al., 2014) electrodes. The latency of this component
is prolonged (up to 200 ms later) when the contrast of the
stimuli is lowered (Ojanen et al., 2003). The VAN is usually
followed by a later positive component, called Late Positivity
(LP; Del Cul et al., 2007), another difference wave between
aware and unaware conditions peaking between 300 and 400 ms
after stimulus presentation in parietal and central sites. Finally,
weaker evidence has been found also for an enhancement of
P1 amplitude in response to aware trials at around 100–130 ms
in the occipital sites (Pins and Ffytche, 2003), even if this
early positive component might better reflect attention-related
processes (Hillyard et al., 1998).
Importantly, it has been proposed (Block, 2005) that a
distinction needs to be made between two components of
consciousness: phenomenal consciousness, described as the
“what-it-is-like” of the experience (the actual content), and access
consciousness that is the ability to report, remember or act
on such experiences. Accordingly, different NCC might reflect
each one of these components (Block, 1996). Following the
classification made by Block, Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010)
have proposed that the two components typically found in
ERP experiments to correlate with visual awareness (VAN and
LP) may represent distinctive NCC of the different properties
of consciousness. More specifically, given their latencies and
topographies, the VAN, the earlier ERP component, has been
interpreted (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010) as the neural correlate
of phenomenal awareness, whereas the LP, the later ERP
component, has been related to access awareness.
Together with the classification of consciousness in the
phenomenal and the access components, another important
issue that has to be taken into account when investigating
visual awareness relates to the way the perceptual experience
is reported. Studies on unconscious perception typically require
the participants to report whether or not they saw a stimulus,
thus measuring their conscious experiences in a dichotomous
way (e.g., Baars, 1994). In this perspective, then, consciousness
is considered as an all-or-none process. However, it has been
argued that conscious perception is a complex phenomenon
characterized by different degrees of clarity, thus needing
more elaborated report measures to be adopted (Ramsøy and
Overgaard, 2004).
In the light of these considerations, in order to obtain
more detailed subjective reports Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004)
developed a four-point scale to assess the clarity of perceptual
experiences: the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). The four
points consistently used by the participants to judge their
visual perceptions were: (1) no experience of the stimulus,
(2) brief glimpse, (3) almost clear experience and (4) clear
experience. The PAS proved to be the most exhaustive measure
of visual awareness compared to other graded scales and
showed a good correlation between performance and awareness,
possibly implying that different cognitive processes actually take
place for each level of the scale (Sandberg et al., 2010). The
four categories of the PAS thus refer to the quality of the
perceptual experience, differently from confidence ratings that
mostly involve metacognitive knowledge about the perceptual
content (see Sandberg et al., 2010 for a comparison of report
methodologies).
Accordingly, an fMRI study (Christensen et al., 2006)
investigated the neural correlates of the use of a three-point scale
(clear, vague, no perceptual experience) to rate the clarity of visual
experiences in response to briefly presented stimuli. Interestingly,
the authors revealed that different levels of awareness correlated
with different degrees but also with different patterns of
brain activation. More specifically, reports of clear experiences
activated a network including parietal, temporal, frontal, basal
ganglia and thalamic areas, while reports of vague perception
resulted in graded activation within the same network but also
in specific activations in frontal and insular regions, not seen for
reports of clear experiences. Also a recent MEG study (Andersen
et al., 2015) found that, during a visual masking task, occipital
sources in the VAN time range were more accurate in decoding
visual awareness as assessed on the four categories of the PAS,
providing further evidence that perceptual awareness may be best
described as a graded phenomenon.
So far, just a few papers have used a graded scale to assess
visual awareness using EEG. The most evident limitation is that
not all the categories of the scale were actually investigated.
For example, Melloni et al. (2011) studied how previous
experience affected conscious perception of stimuli presented
at different degradation levels. Participants had to rate target
visibility on the PAS, but then the authors decided to recode
the scale into a dichotomous scale and found that P200
amplitude was inversely modulated by perceptual awareness.
More recently, in another study Koivisto et al. (2013) focused
on the role of recurrent interactions for categorization of
natural scenes and the PAS was used in an object substitution
masking experiment. However, due to the small number of
‘no experience’ ratings, behavioral analyses were carried out by
pooling together the ratings of the two lowest PAS categories
(‘no experience’ and ‘brief glimpse’), showing how reduced
perceptual awareness following masking affected categorization
performance. Moreover, ERPs were investigated only for masked
and unmasked trials, regardless of PAS rating. The situation
is more complex when even a more fine-graded continuous
scale is used to evaluate subjective visibility by moving a cursor
on a horizontal bar where only the extremes are labeled (‘not
seen’ and ‘maximal visibility’). Such a scale was employed in
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an attentional blink (Sergent et al., 2005) and in a masking
(Del Cul et al., 2007) experiment; for both tasks the authors
found that visibility ratings could be neatly divided into two
categories, seen and not seen trials, without intermediate graded
ratings, thus showing a sort of non-linear trend for visual
awareness.
It thus seems clear that the difficult part is to get enough trials
for each category of the scale, in order to perform analyses on all
of them.
The aim of the present study is to explore the possible neural
correlates of different grades of visual awareness. To do so, we
studied the ERPs in response to reduced contrast visual stimuli at
a detection threshold of about 50%. Participants had to judge the
brightness of the stimuli and then qualitatively rate their visual
experiences on the four-point PAS (Ramsøy and Overgaard,
2004). It was hypothesized that different grades of awareness
may be reflected by different amplitudes of the components
related to conscious perception (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003;
Pins and Ffytche, 2003; Del Cul et al., 2007). More specifically,
if consciousness is indeed a graded phenomenon, then a linear
increase of the amplitudes of the components should be observed
as a function of visual awareness. Furthermore, from the analysis
of the intracranial generators we could draw some conclusions on
where visual awareness emerges in the brain.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty right-handed participants (13 females, mean age ±
standard deviation: 22.5 ± 2.11) were recruited for the study. All
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history
of neurological or psychiatric disorders. They all gave their
written informed consent to participate in the study. The study
was approved by the local Ethics Committee and conducted in
accordance with the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki. Data from six
participants were excluded because there were not enough trials
for analysis (<40 trials per condition) or because they showed
an unequal distribution of the two stimulus types (lighter and
darker) in one or more conditions. Two participants were not
included in the study because of persistent noise in the EEG
signal. The final sample was thus composed of 12 participants (11
females, mean age± standard deviation: 23.08± 2.06).
Stimuli
The stimuli were two-dimensional lighter or darker gray
Gaussian patches with a standard deviation of 0.5◦, presented
for 34 ms on a gray background (8.01 cd/m2) at an eccentricity
of 7◦ along the vertical meridian and of 12◦ along the
horizontal meridian to the right of the fixation point. Two
stimulus luminance values (one lighter and one darker than the
background) were determined for each participant by means of
a threshold assessment procedure: during this phase five different
lighter luminance values (ranging from 6.65 cd/m2 to 7.60 cd/m2)
and five different darker luminance values (ranging from 8.69
cd/m2 to 9.77 cd/m2) were used.
Threshold Assessment
In a dimly lit testing room participants sat in front of a 17′ CRT
monitor (resolution 1024 × 768, refresh rate of 85 Hz) placed at
a viewing distance of 57 cm, with their head laying on a chin rest.
The aim was to find two individual luminance values (one lighter
and one darker) at which the participants reported to be aware of
about 50% of the stimuli. The detection threshold was measured
using the method of constant stimuli (Urban, 1910), where the
preselected luminance values were presented in a randomized
order in the periphery of the right visual field (see “Stimuli” for
details). The procedure included 10 blocks: on each block, each
luminance value was tested five times, resulting in a total number
of 500 trials per participant. On each trial the stimulus appeared
after a random interval (300–600 ms) following a brief 1000 Hz
warning tone. The participants were asked to keep their eyes on a
central fixation cross and press the spacebar whenever they saw
a stimulus. At the end of the threshold assessment one lighter
luminance value and one darker luminance value related to a
50%-detection threshold were chosen for each participant. These
two luminance values were then used in the second phase of the
experiment.
EEG Experiment
Each trial started with a black fixation cross, followed 400 ms later
by a 1000 Hz warning tone. After a random interval ranging from
200 to 600 ms a lighter or a darker gray Gaussian patch (whose
luminance values were determined in the threshold assessment)
was presented for 34 ms in the periphery of the right visual
field. A 1000 ms pause was then followed by a response prompt
asking the participants to judge the brightness of the stimulus
as compared with the gray background, pressing a button for
“lighter” and another button for “darker.” The participants were
required to answer even if they did not see any stimulus. Then
another response prompt asked the participants to rate the quality
of their perception on the four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale
(PAS; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). The four PAS categories are:
(0) no experience of the stimulus, (1) a brief glimpse, meaning
that the participant saw something but could not discriminate
the brightness of the stimulus, (2) an almost clear experience
and (3) a clear experience. Responses were given by pressing
four different buttons on the keyboard (Figure 1A). In order to
verify that the participants used the PAS properly, at the end of
the experiment we administered an open-ended questionnaire
asking them to describe the criteria used for each category of
the scale. The experimental session was divided into 20 blocks
(66 trials each: 30 lighter, 30 darker and 6 stimulus-absent
trials), thus yielding a total of 1320 trials. The order of the
trials was fully randomized. Both the threshold assessment and
the EEG experiment were programmed and run using E-prime
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA1).
EEG Recording and Event-Related Brain
Potential (ERP) Analysis
EEG signal was continuously recorded with BrainAmp system
(Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany – BrainVision
1https://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm
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FIGURE 1 | Trial procedure and results. (A) Experimental procedure: first, a fixation cross was presented for 400 ms followed by a warning acoustic tone lasting
150 ms. Then, a random interval ranging from 200 to 600 ms preceded the stimulus presentation (34 ms) in the periphery of the right visual field. After a 1000 ms
pause participants had to discriminate the brightness of the stimulus (Discrimination task) and then rate the clarity of their perception on the PAS (Awareness task).
(B) Behavioral results: mean percentage of correct responses for each level of the PAS. Error bars represent standard errors and the solid line (50%) chance level.
(C) ERPs: grand average ERPs in response to each category of the PAS and catch trials for electrode Cp5. Gray dotted boxes indicate the components of interest
(respectively VAN and LP). (D) Single subject behavioral data. The thick black line represents the mean of accuracy. (E) Single subject amplitudes of the VAN
component as a function of the differences between each conscious condition (PAS = 1, 2, and 3) and the unconscious condition (PAS = 0). The thick black line
represents the average of single subject amplitudes. (F) Single subject amplitudes of the LP component as a function of the differences between each conscious
condition (PAS = 1, 2, and 3) and the unconscious condition (PAS = 0). The thick black line represents the average of single subject amplitudes.
Recorder) using a Fast’n Easy cap with 27 Ag/AgCl pellet
pin electrodes (EasyCap GmbH, Herrsching, Germany) placed
according to the 10–20 International System (O1, O2, P7, P3, Pz,
P4, P8, Cp5, Cp1, Cp2, Cp6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, Fc5, Fc1, Fc2,
Fc6, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, Fp1, Fp2). Four additional electrodes were
used for monitoring blinks and eye movements. Horizontal and
vertical eye movements were detected respectively with electrodes
placed at the left and right canthi and above and below the right
eye. Other two extra electrodes served as ground (AFz) and online
reference (right mastoid, RM). All scalp channels were then re-
referenced oﬄine to the left mastoid (LM). Electrode impedances
were kept below 5 k. The digitization rate was 1000 Hz with a
time constant of 10 s as low cut-off and a high cut-off of 250 Hz.
The continuous EEG signal was then processed off-line using
Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0. Data were filtered with a high-
frequency cutoff of 50 Hz (12 dB/octave) and a low-frequency
cutoff of 0.1 Hz (12 dB/octave), and a 50 Hz notch filter was
used to remove 50 Hz interference. Channels Fp1 and Fp2 were
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removed in all participants due to excessive noise. Independent
component analysis (ICA) was applied to the whole dataset
using the Infomax ICA algorithm (Bell and Sejnowski, 1995)
in order to eliminate artefactual ICs. The EEG data were then
cut into epochs of 1200 ms starting 200 ms before the onset of
the stimulus and segmented trials were baseline corrected on
the 200 ms pre-stimulus period. Before averaging, all segments
were visually inspected and removed if contaminated by eye
movements, blinks, strong muscle activity or excessive noisy
EEG. The averaging was carried out for five different conditions:
PAS = 0 (correct lighter and darker trials receiving a rating of 0
on the PAS), PAS = 1 (correct lighter and darker trials receiving
a rating of 1 on the PAS), PAS = 2 (correct lighter and darker
trials receiving a rating of 2 on the PAS), PAS= 3 (correct lighter
and darker trials receiving a rating of 3 on the PAS) and Catch
(stimulus-absent trials receiving a rating of 0 on the PAS). After
pre-processing, the mean number of trials used for the average
was 103 for PAS= 0, 75 for PAS= 1, 88.25 for PAS= 2, 65.92 for
PAS= 3 and 57.83 for the Catch condition. Finally, for statistical
analysis, data were downsampled to 250 Hz.
Statistical Analysis
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried
out on the mean percentage of correct responses of each level
of the PAS. A non-parametric binomial test was performed
on the same measures to determine whether accuracies were
significantly different from chance (50%).
Each conscious condition (PAS = 1, 2, and 3) was pairwise
compared to the unconscious (PAS= 0) condition with the Mass
Univariate ERP Toolbox (Groppe et al., 2011) implemented in
Matlab by means of repeated measures, two-tailed t-tests on
consecutive mean amplitude time windows of 20 ms, from 0 to
1000 ms at all electrode sites. For the three pairwise comparisons
(PAS = 1 versus PAS = 0; PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0; PAS = 3
versus PAS = 0) the classic Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) false
discovery rate (FDR) control procedure was applied with an FDR
level of 5%.
Other two repeated-measures ANOVAs were then conducted
in order to test whether the increment in amplitude of the VAN
and the LP as a function of perceived clarity was linear. To do
so, we evaluated by means of the trend analysis implemented
as part of the analysis performed by the ANOVA in SPSS,
whether a linear or non-linear (quadratic or cubic) function best
represented data distribution by using polynomial coefficients.
The first ANOVA was performed on the mean amplitude of the
significant 20 ms time window (280–300 ms, VAN time range)
of each level of the PAS for electrodes Cp5 and T7 separately
(selected on the basis of the previous analysis). The second
ANOVA was run on the mean amplitude of a significant 40 ms
time window (510–550 ms, LP time range) of each level of the
scale for electrode Pz only (selected according to the literature).
The generators contributing to the different levels of
awareness as assessed on the PAS were defined using Scalp
Current Density (SCD) maps, as implemented in BrainVision
Analyzer 2.0. SCD maps are calculated from the Laplacian second
derivative of the field potential that is directly proportional to
the current density. This technique is independent from the
reference electrode and mathematically eliminates the voltage
gradients caused by tangential current flows, thus emphasizing
the local contributions to the surface maps and providing a better
visualization of approximate locations of intracranial generators.
SCD topographic maps were computed from the spherical spline
interpolation of the surface voltage recording (Perrin et al.,
1989) for each conscious-unconscious difference. A fourth-order
spherical spline was used with a spline-smoothing coefficient
(λ) of 1 × 10−6. In order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio
and to account for inter-individual differences, SCD maps were
created on the grand averages of the differences between each
conscious condition (PAS = 1, PAS = 2, PAS = 3) and the
unconscious condition (PAS= 0). As a result of the three pairwise
comparisons, SCD analyses were performed on the VAN (280–
300 ms) and LP (510–550 ms) time windows. The display gain of
the maps was defined by visually inspecting the baseline period
of the SCD maps (from −200 to 0 ms) to better appreciate the
contribution of noise to the SCD topographies.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Behavioral Results
After the threshold assessment the mean luminance value chosen
for lighter trials was of 9.23 cd/m2 and of 7.23 cd/m2 for darker
trials. The mean percentage of catch trials receiving a rating
of 0 on the PAS was 92.10% (SD = 5.19), thus revealing the
reliability of the participants. For all trials, the mean percentage
of PAS = 0 responses given by the participants was 42.66%,
for PAS = 1 was 22.66%, for PAS = 2 was 22.88% and for
PAS = 3 was 11.78%. A repeated-measures ANOVA conducted
on the mean percentage of correct responses for each category
of the PAS showed that, as visual awareness increased, also
accuracy significantly increased [F(3,33) = 156.46, p < 0.01;
linear trend F(1,11)= 1279.817, p < 0.01]. The mean percentage
of correct responses for PAS = 0 was 51.15%, for PAS = 1 was
72.82%, for PAS = 2 was 85.68% and for PAS = 3 was 95.81%
(Figure 1B). Interestingly, also at the single subject level this
linear trend could be observed (Figure 1D), both for included
and excluded (data not shown) participants. Finally, a non-
parametric binomial test performed to determine whether the
accuracy of each PAS level significantly differed from chance
(50%) revealed that the performance when PAS= 1, PAS= 2 and
PAS= 3 was significantly above chance level (all ps< 0.01), while
for PAS= 0 it was not different from 50% (p > 0.05).
ERP Results
Visual inspection of the grand average ERPs of each category of
the PAS confirmed the presence of an early negative deflection
(VAN) peaking at 300 ms at left channels followed by a later
bilateral positive deflection (LP) starting at∼400 ms (Figure 1C).
To compare each conscious condition (PAS = 1, PAS = 2,
PAS= 3) with the unconscious condition (PAS= 0) we analyzed
the corresponding mean amplitudes by means of the Mass
Univariate analysis (Groppe et al., 2011) in consecutive time
windows of 20 ms, starting from 0 to 1000 ms after stimulus
onset, at all electrodes. For the PAS = 1 versus PAS = 0 pairwise
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comparison, all significant FDR-corrected p-values were between
0.049056 and 0.001173 (Figure 2A), for PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0
between 0.049848 and 0.000320 (Figure 2B) and for PAS = 3
versus PAS= 0 between 0.047111 and 0.000040 (Figure 2C).
Visual Awareness Negativity
In the VAN time range (∼280–300 ms) the first conscious-
unconscious pairwise comparison performed on PAS = 1 versus
PAS = 0 conditions demonstrated that the ERP amplitudes
differed significantly at electrodes T7 and Cp5 in the left
hemisphere, contralateral to stimulus presentation (Figure 2A).
The two-tailed t-tests of the second pairwise comparison on
PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0 conditions revealed a significant
difference again at left electrodes T7 and Cp5 but also at electrode
P7 (Figure 2B). Finally, the two-tailed t-tests on PAS = 3 versus
PAS = 0 conditions showed similar results to those obtained in
the previous comparisons: the VAN effect was broader both in
terms of time and number of significant electrodes (P7, P3, Cp5,
Cp1, C3, T7, Fc1, and Fc5), spreading to left centro-parietal sites,
as depicted in Figure 2C.
To test whether there was a linear increase in the amplitude
of the VAN components, two repeated-measures analyses of
variance were carried out for electrodes T7 and Cp5 on the
mean amplitudes of each level of the PAS in the significant
20 ms time window (280–300 ms). We decided to choose these
two channels since both of them resulted significant in all the
three conscious-unconscious pairwise comparisons in the VAN
time range. The two ANOVAs showed that for both electrodes
the amplitude of the VAN increased as a function of visual
awareness [T7: F(3,33)= 16.299, p< 0.01; Cp5: F(3,33)= 19.435,
p< 0.01]. Interestingly, the analyses revealed a linear modulation
in the increase of both electrode amplitudes [T7: linear trend
F(1,11) = 34.858, p < 0.01; Cp5: linear trend F(1,11) = 54.263,
p < 0.01] and such linear trend was evident in the data of each
participant (Figure 1E).
Conscious conditions thus seemed to elicit more negative
responses than the unconscious condition, as revealed by the
presence of a reliable negative early component (VAN). The
component peaked between 280 and 300 ms and was evident
at left lateral posterior channels spreading to more parietal and
central sites as visual awareness increased. Moreover, there was a
linear graded modulation of the amplitude of the component as a
function of the levels of visual awareness.
Late Positivity
Corresponding pairwise comparisons were performed in the
LP time window. The two-tailed t-tests on PAS = 1 versus
PAS= 0 conditions showed a widespread LP component starting
at ∼420 ms post-stimulus and continuing until the end of the
epoch (1000 ms), particularly over posterior and central sites,
bilaterally (Figure 2A). The comparison performed on PAS = 2
versus PAS = 0 conditions revealed a widespread LP component
that started at∼360 ms and continued up to 1000 ms showing the
most consistent effects bilaterally at posterior, central and partly
also at prefrontal channels (Figure 2B). Finally, the two-tailed
t-tests on the last conscious-unconscious comparison performed
on PAS= 3 versus PAS= 0 found significant differences between
the two conditions starting at ∼340 ms up to 1000 ms over all
channels bilaterally (Figure 2C).
One repeated-measures ANOVA was performed for electrode
Pz on the mean amplitudes of each level of the PAS in a 40 ms
time window around the peak (510–550 ms) in order to test for
a linear increase of the LP component. Given the widespread
LP effect, channel Pz was chosen for analysis according to the
literature (Del Cul et al., 2007). As for the VAN, the ANOVA
revealed that the amplitude of the LP linearly increased with
higher ratings of visual awareness [F(3,33) = 70.277, p < 0.01;
linear trend F(1,11) = 103.177, p < 0.01] and this linear
modulation was again found at the individual level, as shown in
Figure 1F.
Responses to perceived trials were thus more positive than to
unconscious trials. Such broad LP effect was bilaterally evident
at central, posterior and lateral sites spreading also to prefrontal
channels as visual awareness increased. Finally, the amplitude of
the LP component was linearly modulated by visual awareness.
Scalp Current Density Maps
Intracranial generators of the VAN and the LP were defined
using SCD maps (Figure 3). According to the SCD topographies,
at the lowest level of visual awareness (PAS = 1), the
VAN component was consistent with left temporal generators,
contralateral to stimulus presentation. The effect then spread
to left posterior parietal areas at the intermediate level of
awareness (PAS = 2) and finally activated a complex comprising
also fronto-central generators at the highest level of conscious
perception (PAS = 3). As regards the LP effect, the SCD
topographies were consistent with bilateral posterior, lateral and
central generators for the lowest and intermediate levels of visual
awareness (PAS = 1 and PAS = 2), while for reports of clear
experience (PAS = 3), current density foci were observed over
different scalp areas including the prefrontal cortex and seemed
larger in the right hemisphere. The intracranial generators of
the phenomenal awareness (as assessed by the VAN) were thus
found in the left temporal lobe, then the activation spread
to posterior, central and prefrontal areas as a function of
visual awareness. The LP component, interpreted to reflect
access awareness, originated bilaterally in posterior, lateral and
central areas extending to prefrontal regions as perceived clarity
increased.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, participants were required to rate the clarity
of their perceptual experience of low-contrast stimuli on the
four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy and Overgaard,
2004). We found that their discrimination accuracy increased
linearly as visual awareness increased. Moreover, ERP results
revealed two electrophysiological components correlating with
visual awareness. A negative early deflection, the VAN, peaking
around 280–300 ms at lateral, parietal and central sites in the
left hemisphere, followed by a later positive component, the LP,
starting bilaterally 400 ms after stimulus onset over different scalp
regions. As for accuracy, the amplitude of both components was
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FIGURE 2 | Raster plots. FDR-controlled t-test from Mass Univariate analyses of the three comparisons between each conscious (PAS = 1, 2, and 3) condition
and the unconscious (PAS = 0) condition. T-tests were performed on the mean amplitude of consecutive time windows of 20 ms. (A) PAS = 1 versus PAS = 0.
(B) PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0. (C) PAS = 3 versus PAS = 0.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 572
fpsyg-07-00572 April 21, 2016 Time: 16:43 # 8
Tagliabue et al. Electrophysiology of Graded Visual Consciousness
FIGURE 3 | SCD topographic maps. SCD foci for the VAN (upper; time window from 280 to 300 ms) and LP (lower; time window from 510 to 550 ms)
components performed on the grand average of the differences between each conscious condition (PAS = 1, 2, and 3) and the unconscious condition (PAS = 0).
found to increase linearly as a function of visual awareness as
assessed on the PAS.
These results provide evidence that visual perceptual
experience is characterized by a gradual increase of perceived
clarity at both behavioral (accuracies) and neural (amplitudes)
level. Such findings seem to be inconsistent with those by Del
Cul et al. (2007), in which both accuracies and subjective ratings
collected on a continuous scale where only the extremes were
labeled exhibited a non-linear dichotomous distribution and the
P300 was the only component whose amplitude varied with a
similar sigmoidal trend to subjective ratings. The authors thus
concluded that the P300 reflected the final stage of a process that
led to an all-or-none reportability of a perceptual experience
and they seem to allude to what Block (2005) defined “access
consciousness.” However, it has been argued that the components
in the P300 latency range and, thus, access consciousness might
better reflect post-perceptual processes or consequences of
consciousness, such as the confidence of the observer (Eimer
and Mazza, 2005), different levels of accumulation of sensory
evidence (Melloni et al., 2011) or working memory update
(Polich, 2007). Given that the PAS is a measure of clarity of
the perceptual experience and not a measure of confidence in
response accuracy, our data would suggest that the LP might
reflect the linear increase of the sensory evidence as the clarity of
perceptual experience increases, in line with the interpretation
given by Melloni et al. (2011).
Importantly, what proved to be the earliest most reliable
correlate of phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2005), across
different experimental paradigms and attentional manipulations,
is the VAN, interpreted (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010) as the
correlate of the actual content of perception as opposed to later
post-perceptual processes (for a review see Railo et al., 2011).
In agreement with this interpretation, the quality judgments
given by our participants on the PAS were reflected in a
concurrent linear modulation of the VAN amplitude, showing
that different levels of cortical activity determined different levels
of perceptual clarity. Similar results were found by Moutoussis
and Zeki (2002) that showed how the difference between
perceived and invisible stimuli depended on the strength of brain
activation.
Our results are in line with findings obtained with different
neuroimaging techniques. In an fMRI study (Christensen et al.,
2006), reports of vague perceptual clarity versus clear experiences
resulted in graded brain activity but also in unique patterns
of cortical activation. As regards MEG, a recent experiment
(Andersen et al., 2015) showed that occipital sources at the
time window of the VAN could better decode graded levels of
perceptual consciousness as assessed on the PAS. Taken together,
all these pieces of evidence seem to support the graded nature
of visual experience. Moreover, given its early latency, the VAN
seems to be the component that better tackles the different
degrees of perceived clarity of the phenomenal content.
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An important point that deserves some considerations
relates to the “where in the brain” perceptual awareness
emerges. Our study, together with previous studies (e.g.,
Koivisto et al., 2013; Sandberg et al., 2013), seems to indicate
that processes correlating with the graded contents of visual
experience take place in temporal areas. The presence of
early generators (VAN) in such posterior areas might be in
line with data on phosphene perception (Bagattini et al.,
2015): in this paper, the authors have proved how phosphene
perception following occipital TMS stimulation is generated
in the temporal cortex, while phosphene perception after
parietal stimulation arises from the parietal regions. The fact
that different generators have actually been found for the
two different stimulation conditions thus confirms that the
temporal and parietal cortices themselves are independent
generators of conscious visual percepts. Both these and our
results seem to be in favor of Zeki’s “micro-consciousness”
proposal (Zeki and Ffytche, 1998), stating that local early
activity in higher-order extrastriate regions plays a key role
in generating visual perception. Indeed, it is evident from
the analysis of intracranial sources that visual consciousness
does not require later widespread fronto-parietal activation, as
proposed by the Global Workspace Theory (GWT; Dehaene,
2014). This, again, is confirmed by phosphene studies (Bagattini
et al., 2015), since a patient with a complete lesion of V1
showed differences for phosphene awareness only in an early
time window, unlike healthy participants where differences
were found also in a later phase in occipital and frontal
areas. Likewise, recent MEG findings (Andersen et al., 2015)
revealed that frontal sources at the P300 time range could not
decode all PAS ratings. All these results seem to strengthen
the assumption that such later frontal activity might support
those consequences of consciousness (LP or access consciousness;
Block, 2005) that are related to the components in the
P300 time window (confidence, Eimer and Mazza, 2005;
accumulation of sensory evidence, Melloni et al., 2011; update
of working memory, Polich, 2007) and not perceptual awareness
itself.
Another interesting aspect is that the PAS (Ramsøy and
Overgaard, 2004) proved to be a good report measure to
investigate different levels of perceptual clarity. Indeed, in the
present study participants could use all the categories of the
scale. Besides, we found that different levels of accuracy, and
both the access properties (LP) and, more importantly, the actual
phenomenal content of consciousness (VAN) differed depending
on the levels of the PAS further corroborating the suggestion
(Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004) that each judgment given
by the participants actually implies differences in processing.
The implications related to such findings are important when
considering blindsight patients. Blindsight follows a lesion in
the primary visual cortex, resulting in a preserved ability to
detect and discriminate visual stimuli presented in the blind
field yet reporting no awareness of them: a phenomenon at first
described as a case of unconscious vision (Weiskrantz, 1986).
The exact mechanisms that are responsible for blindsight are
still unknown but some patients with a huge lesion of V1 have
been reported to exhibit some residual visual consciousness in
their damaged hemifield (Barbur et al., 1993; Zeki and Ffytche,
1998). The use of a graded scale, such as the PAS, together with
electrophysiological measures, might be helpful in discriminating
patients showing a genuine blindsight phenomenon from those
having residual conscious vision. In fact, using a dichotomous
scale might not be sufficient to detect weaker forms of conscious
perception, as already illustrated by Overgaard et al. (2008) in
their seminal paper and more recently by Mazzi et al. (under
review). In these studies, patient GR (Overgaard et al., 2008)
and patient SL (Mazzi et al., under review), both suffering
from a damage to the left occipital lobe, exhibited a blindsight
behavior when tested with a binary seen/unseen scale, while
when using the PAS, visual awareness was predictive of their
performance, thus exhibiting conscious, yet degraded, vision.
It could, thus, be predicted that patients diagnosed with
degraded vision (as assessed on the PAS or another graded
scale) would show similar components (VAN and LP) as the
healthy participants in the present paper while genuine blindsight
patients would not.
To summarize, we found that discrimination performance
in a task with low-contrast stimuli increased as a function of
visual awareness together with a linear amplitude modulation of
the components correlating with the perceptual content (VAN)
and post-perceptual processes (LP), suggesting that the nature
of visual consciousness might be gradual. We also propose that
the conscious phenomenal content of perceptual experiences
emerges from the activation in temporal areas, as indicated by the
topography of the intracortical generators of the VAN. Finally,
the PAS seems to be an exhaustive measure in order to obtain
more detailed subjective ratings.
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